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Federal Reserve Intervention Policy 
By Richard  K Abrams 
On  November 1, 1978, the Federal  Reserve 
and the U.S.  Treasury announced a  new  and 
expanded  program  to defend  the foreign 
exchange  value  of  the  dollar.  The  program 
included an increase in  the Federal  Reserve's 
discount rate, the imposition of  reserve require- 
ments on large time deposits, and an expansion 
of  U.S. intervention capabilities in the foreign 
exchange  markets.  A  major  aspect  of  the 
expanded  intervention  capability  was  an 
increase in  the size of  Federal Reserve's  swap 
lines with  several  key  central  banks,  thereby 
allowing greater  foreign exchange borrowings 
for purposes of intervention. As  a result of the 
November action, increased attention  has been 
focused on the importance of  the swap network 
and  intervention policies in  foreign exchange 
markets. 
This  article  will  examine  Federal  Reserve 
intervention policy, giving special emphasis to 
the swap  network.'  The first section discusses 
the mechanics of swap intervention. The second 
reviews  U.S.  intervention  activities  and  the 
THE NATURE AND WORKINGS OF 
THE SWAP NETWORK 
Federal  Reserve  intervention  is  normally 
undertaken to ease selling pressure against the 
dollar in  the foreign exchange  markets.  Such 
intervention requires that the Federal  Reserve  . 
act as a seller of foreign exchange and a buyer 
of dollars. If the Federal Reserve already holds 
the  required  foreign exchange as  a  result  of 
past borrowings or dollar sales, these funds are 
sold  directly  to  the  market;  otherwise,  the 
funds must  be borrowed. Historically,  almost 
all such borrowing has been through the swap 
network.'  This network is a  set  of  short-term 
reciprocal  currency  agreements  the  Federal 
Reserve  maintains  with  14  foreign  central 
banks  and  the  Bank  of  International  Settle- 
ments  (BIS).  Each  agreement  allows  the 
Federal Reserve  and  the partner  bank  short- 
term  access  to  the other's  currency  up  to  a  . 
specified limit. At present, the total size of  the 
swap network is $29.8  billion. 
evolution  of  intervention  policy  through  the 
fixed and floating rate periods. 
2 The Treasury can obtain foreign exchange by  borrowing 
from the International Monetary Fund  (IMF), by  selling 
foreign-denominated  securities,  and  by  selling  Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR's), which are effectively central bank 
money issued by the IMF. However, it did not exercise this 
1 The  Exchange  Stabilization  Fund  (ESF)  of  the  U.S.  ,  option during the floating rate period prior to November 1, 
Treasury may  participate with  the Federal  Reserve  in  its  1978.  The value of  the SDR  is  based  on  a geometrically 
intervention activities, with  the Federal  Reserve  Bank of  weighted average of  16 currencies, with  the weights based 
New  York acting as the Treasury's agent.  on the country's quota at the IMF. 
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day  that  Federal  Reserve  swap  intervention 
takes place.  To  write  a  contract, the Federal 
Reserve  calculates  the  dollar  amount  of  the 
intervention, and the average exchange rate at 
which  trades took  place.  The Federal Reserve 
gives the foreign central bank a dollar account 
equal  to  the  size  of  the  intervention  and 
receives sufficient foreign exchange to cover its 
dollar  purchases.  The  foreign  bank's  dollars 
are  then  invested  in  a  nonnegotiable  U.S. 
Treasury certificate of  indebtedness  until  the 
swap is retired. 
Swaps mature in 90 days. They are retired by 
repurchasing the foreign bank's  dollars at the 
original  exchange  rate.  If  the  dollar  has 
appreciated in the interim, the Federal Reserve 
will  realize a  profit on  the swap  because  the 
foreign  exchange  will  cost  fewer  dollars. 
However, if  the dollar has declined, a loss will 
occur. Furthermore, if the dollar has remained 
weak throughout the period, the swap  may  be 
renewed  in order  to prevent additional  dollar 
sales from causing the dollar to decline further. 
U.S.  intervention  is  carried  out  on  a 
day-to-day  basis  by  officers  at  the  foreign 
exchange desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New  Y~rk.~  If intervention is planned for any 
day, the officers discuss the intervention limits 
for the day with the central banks whose swap 
lines they plan to use.  Sometimes the foreign 
bank will suggest intervention limits that differ 
from  those suggested  by  Federal  Reserve 
officials.'  Because swap lines can only be drawn 
upon  by  mutual  consent,  negotiations  must 
3 If  the  planned  intervention  is  greater  than  the  limits 
specified in  the  Federal  Open  Market Committee's 
(FOMC's)  procedural  instructions,  the  Foreign  Currency 
Subcommittee  of  the  FOMC  and  the  officials  of  the 
Treasury must first be consulted.  Overnight of the Effect of 
Floating Exchange Rates on U.S. Exports, Hearing Before 
the Subcommittee on  International  Finance  of  the 
Committee on Banking,  Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. 
Senate, 95th Cong., 2d sess., February 6, 1978, p. 56. 
then  take  place,  with  the smaller  of  the  two 
proposed limits being accepted. 
Given  the  intervention  limits,  intervention 
can be either indirect or direct. In the indirect 
approach, the Federal Reserve uses a commer- 
cial bank as an agent to buy funds according to 
conditions set  by  the Federal Re~erve.~  In the 
direct  approach,  which  relies  heavily  on  the 
"announcement" effect,  the  Federal  Reserve 
contacts  banks  directly  with  offers  to  buy 
dollars.  At  times  almost  every  major  trading 
bank may receive offers to buy dollars. 
The purpose of  both  approaches  is to ease 
selling pressure against the dollar and to alter 
the short-run expectations of the traders in the 
foreign  exchange  markets.  Because  the  time 
horizon of  traders is sometimes  very  short,  a 
moderate  change  in  market  behavior  can 
sometimes encourage trades to replenish their 
dollar portfolios, causing the dollar to appreci- 
ate.  However,  if  the  traders  believe  strongly 
that the decline  will  continue,  the  market  is 
large enough to render almost any central bank 
intervention ineffe~tive.~ 
Anatol B. Balbach showed in his paper, "The Mechanics 
of  Intervention  in  Exchange  Markets," Federal  Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis Review,  Vol. 60, No.  2, February 1978, 
that drawing of the swap line, other things equal, expands 
the money supply of the accommodating country during the 
life of  the swap,  while leaving the  money  supply  of  the 
initiating country unchanged. Therefore, the foreign 
central  bank  may  oppose  a  swap  drawing  because  of 
domestic monetarv considerations. 
5 Conversations with  traders  at  commercial  banks  have 
shown that they sometimes guess incorrectly as to whether 
or not the Federal Reserve has been intervening.  Further, 
when  they correctly  guessed  the intervention,  their 
estimates  of  the  size  of  the  action  were  often  very 
inaccurate. 
6 The estimated volume of  foreign  exchange  transactions 
was over $100 billion a month in  New  York City alone in 
April  1977.  Roger  M.  Kubarych,  Fo-  Exchange 
Marketa in the Unlted States (New York: Federal Reserve 
Bank of New  York, 1978), p. 5. 
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THE FIXED RATE PERIOD 
From  1944  until  early  1973,  most  of  the 
world's currencies functioned under a regime of 
fixed  exchange  rates  known  as  the  Bretton 
Woods system.  During most of  this period, the 
United States needed no intervention policy, for 
the  dollar  acted  as  the  cornerstone  of  the 
system.  The  other  currencies  floated  within 
narrow  bands  against  the  dollar,  while  the 
dollar maintained convertibility into gold  at a 
fixed rate.  If  a country's  currency approached 
the  lower  end  of  its  band,  it  had  to either 
devalue  or  sell  dollars  to  defend  its  parity 
range. If the currency rose to the upper end, it 
either had to revalue or buy dollars. 
This  system  worked  well  until  the  early 
1960's.  Throughout  this  period,  the  United 
States often had balance of  payments deficits. 
These deficits provided central banks with  the 
reserves required to defend  their  parity range 
against  the  dollar.  However,  because  of  the 
deficits, concern arose that the  United  States 
would be unable to maintain its exchange rate. 
As  a result, in March 1961 the German  mark 
was  revalued  by  5  per  cent,  with  the 
Netherlands guilder soon following. This action 
made  all  currencies  candidates  for  upward 
revaluation or devaluation, for it was  now  felt 
the  other  countries  would  be  unwilling  to 
maintain their  under-  or  overvalued  exchange 
rates. As a result, while central banks were able 
to defend their parities in the spot market, many 
were unable to prevent the exchange rates  on 
contracts for future delivery, or forward  rates, 
from diverging from acceptable ranges. 
In  March  1961,  to  maintain  appropriate 
forward  rates,  the  U.S.  Treasury  began .to 
intervene  in the forward  markets  in  German  . 
marks, Swiss francs, and Netherlands guilders. 
The purpose of this action was to bring forward 
exchange rates back into alignment and restore 
confidence in the dollar. The operation proved 
successful, and its success led  U.S.  authorities 
to believe  that future  intervention  might 
provide added stability to the foreign exchange 
markets.  Accordingly, in  February  1%2,  the 
FOMC authorized foreign currency operations. 
By  August of  that year,  the  Federal  Reserve 
had negotiated $700 million in swap lines with 
seven central banks and the BIS. (See Table 1.) 
The  purpose  of  the  swap  network  was  to 
allow central banks to defend the exchange rate 
of  their  country's  currency while  economizing 
on  foreign  exchange  holdings.  Swaps  also 
allowed  foreign  countries  to  protect  the  gold 
value of  their  dollar  reserves  against  a  dollar 
devaluation. By  activating their swap line, they 
could avoid converting their dollars into gold as 
in the past. 
While it is difficult to judge the performance 
of  the  swap  network  during  the  fixed  rate 
period,  central  banks  found  it  a  useful 
mechanism. First, central bankers thought the 
network  sufficiently worthwhile  that they 
expanded it from $700 million in June 1962 to 
$11.7  billion  in  March  1973.  (See  Table 1.) 
Second, the network was used actively, with the 
United States initiating  $11.9 billion in  swaps 
during the period, while foreign central  bank 
drawings  totaled  $15.4  billion.  Finally,  the 
Federal Reserve made profits each year on its 
swap transactions. (See Table 2.) Total realized 
profits came to $27.3 ,million between 1962 and 
March 1973. 
It has been  argued that the losses from the 
swap  debt  outstanding  on  August  15,  1971, 
should be included in the profitability calcula- 
tions for swaps during the fixed  rate  period.' 
These losses, which were brought about by subse- 
quent  declines  in  the exchange  value  of  the 
dollar, totaled $847.8 million through the end 
7 Milton  Friedman,  "Back  to the  Gaming  Table," 
Newsweek, January 30, 1978, p. 65. 
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FEDERAL RESERVE RECIPROCAL CURRENCY  AGREEMENTS 
(In Millions of Dollars). 
Aug. 2,  March 9,  July 10,  March 13,  Nov. 1, 
1962  1973  1973  1978  1978 
National Bank  of Belgium  50  600  1,000  1,000  1.000 
Bank  of Canada  250  1,000  2,000  2,000  2,000 
Bank  of England  50  2,000  2,000  3,000  3,000 
Bank  of France  50  1.000  2,000  2,000  2,000 
German  Federal Bank  50  1,000  2,000  4,000  6,000 
Netherlands Bank  50  300  500  500  500 
Swiss  National Bank  100  1,000  1,400  1,400  4,000 
B.I.S.  (Swiss francs)  100  600  600  600  600 
(Other authorized 
European currencies)  -  1,000  1,250  1,250  1,250 
Austrian National Bank  -  200  250  250  250 
Bank of Denmark  -  200  2  50  250  250 
Bank  of Italy  -  1,250  2,000  3,000  3,000 
Bank of Japan  -  1,000  2,000  2,000  5,000 
Bank  of Mexico  -  130  1  80  360  360 
Bank  of Norway  -  200  250  250  250 
Bank  of Sweden  -  250  300  300  300 
Total  700  11,730  17.980  22.1 60  29,760 
*SOURCE:  Federal  Reserve Bank of  New York, Monthly Review, and Federal Reserve Board Press Release, Novem- 
ber 1, 1978, p. 2. 
of  1978, with another $150 million in losses yet 
to be realized. It may also be  argued  that the 
swap  debt  was  incurred  to  prevent  gold 
outflows to foreign central banks prior  to the 
dollar's  first devaluation.  Therefore,  the swap 
liquidation losses could be at least partly offset 
by unrealized profits from the gold saving that 
resulted  from  the  original  swap  drawing.  In 
fact,  if  all  such  drawings  prevented  gold 
outflows,  the  $1  billion  loss  actually  can  be 
viewed  as  a  net  unrealized  gain  of  over  $5 
billion.'  However,  since  it  is  likely  that  the 
United States would  have devalued sooner had 
these lines  been  unavailable,  the  actual  gold 
saving was probably considerably smaller. 
U.S. INTERVENTION DURING 
THE FLOATING RATE PERIOD 
By  August 1971,  with  the U.S.  balance  of 
payments deficits creating an excess supply of 
dollars, some central  banks began demanding 
8 The limit  value  of  the  gold  saving  was estimated  by 
calculating the price that would have been received for the 
gold if the swap debt  was  retired  by  selling the gold that 
was saved when the original debt was incurred. The gold 
price used was the official price until March 1973 and the 
average quarterly market price of gold for all other periods. 
Thus, for each  quarter:  Potential Profits = (Retirement/ 
$35) x  (Avg.  Gold  Price-  $35)-  (losses  on  Currency 
Liquidation). 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City Table 2 
NET REALIZED PROFITS ( + ) 
AND LOSSES (-)  ON 
FEDERAL RESERVE 
CURRENT FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
OPERATIONS 
1962 THROUGH MARCH 1973 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Federal Reserve 
Year  Net Profits  - 
1962  +0.3 
1963  +0.3 
1964  +0.1 
1965  +1 .O 
1966  +I .4 
1967  +1.3 
1968  +8.1 
1969  +6.4 
1970  +3.0 
1971  +3.7 
1972  +1.4 
1973"  +0.3 
Total Net Profits  +27.3 
*One-fourth of 1973 prof~ts. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York  Quarterly 
Review,  Summer 1978, p. 54. 
gold  for  their  excess  dollar  holdings.  As  a 
consequence,  the United  States  found  it 
necessary to suspend the dollar's convertibility 
into gold,  and  several  major  currencies were 
allowed to float against the dollar. The general 
float continued until December 18, 1971, when 
the Smithsonian Agreement was signed. The new 
agreement accepted a new set of exchange rates, 
while allowing the value of currencies to float in a 
band of 2% per cent on either side of the official 
parity, rather than plus or minus 1 per cent as in 
the past. The dollar was also formally devalued 
by  raising the official price of  gold from $35 to 
$38  an  ounce.  Still,  the  system  remained 
unstable,  and  despite  an  additional  dollar 
devaluation on  February 12, 1973, the system 
collapsed. On March 13, 1973, the United States 
formally announced the dollar  was  a  floating 
currency, starting a new era in Federal Reserve 
intervention policy. 
In  the new  floating  rate era,  some  central 
banks felt that larger swap lines  were  needed 
because  the  foreign  exchange  markets  were 
growing rapidly and official limits on exchange 
fluctuations had  been  removed.  Therefore, on 
July 10, 1973, the United States expanded-,its 
swap lines 53 per cent to $18 billion. (See Table 
1.)  However, the expansion of the swap lines gave 
no  guarantee  that intervention  would  be 
successful,  or  even  appropriate,  because  of 
uncertainty that existed about the appropriate 
value of currencies in the new system. 
The new  problem of  intervention policy  was 
that  it was now more &fficult to identify the mar- 
ket conditions in which  intervention might  be 
appropriate. Previously, a market had been con- 
sidered disorderly when exchange rates were at 
their  intervention limits.  But  with  no  official 
limits, an exchange rate movement based on a 
change in economic conditions or in the relative 
desirability  of a given currency could be an order- 
ly movement. The new question became whether 
or not the rate had been changing faster or by 
more than it should. The appropriate value of an 
exchange rate at any point, present or future, is 
not always clear9. Thus, intervention has become 
risky  and  difficult.  The  Federal  Reserve's 
No model of exchange rate determination has forecasted 
exchange rate movements very successfully. The modeling 
problems  probably  stem  from  three  sources.  Fist, the 
generalized, managed  float  is  a rather  new  phenomenon, 
and the adaptation of market transactors has been gradual. 
Second, expectations and portfolio considerations are often 
more important than underlying economic considerations. 
At  various  times,  differing  groups  of  transactors  will 
dominate the market. Finally, central banks try  to make 
their  intervention  seem  as  random  as  possible  to  avoid 
traders forecasting it and capitalizing on it. 
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calm  disorders  in  foreign  exchange  markets, 
rather than defend any exchange rate or range of 
rates. 
Determining  what  constitutes  a  disorderly 
market  has  been  both  difficult  and  highly 
subjective. Further, using a rigid decision rule or 
set  of  rules  seems  inappropriate  because 
disorders appear to vary across time. There are, 
however,  certain  circumstances  in  which 
intervention is likely to occur.  One case  is in 
response to major exchange market fluctuations 
that  do  not  appear  to  be  based  on  new 
information  about  the  underlying  economic 
relationships. These fluctuations can either be 
large exchange rate movements, or  a  marked 
widening of  the bid and asked quotations for a 
given currency, for either  would  indicate that 
traders are  unwilling  to  acquire  a  given 
currency.l0  If the Federal Reserve believes these 
fluctuations are not  based  on  underlying 
conditions, or that they are an overreaction to 
some change in  conditions,  intervention often 
occurs. In this way, the Federal Reserve tries to 
persuade traders that there is a two-way risk in 
the market." 
The other major cause for intervention occurs 
when  the  Federal  Reserve  tries  to  smooth 
exchange rate adjustments. The Federal Reserve 
attempts  these  smoothing  actions  when  it 
believes that exchange  rate movements, while 
based on  underlying economic conditions, are 
either too large or too rapid. The purpose of this 
10 Intervention  is  especially  likely  to  occur  when  the 
market appears to have become severely one-sided-such as 
when large exchange rate  movements are  taking place on 
little or  no  trading  volume  and/or  traders are  becoming 
unwilling  to  give  bid  or  asked  quotations  for  certain 
currencies. 
11 Slowing or countering exchange rate movements acts to 
reduce  the  expected  variance  and  volatility  of  exchange 
rates  which  may  lessen  the  uncertainty  of  exporters, 
potential exporters, and people- in  import-competing 
industries. This, in turn, may help to stimulate production 
and trade. 
intervention is  to keep  the  foreign  exchange 
markets  functioning  smoothly,  and  to  help 
prevent "runs"  on the dollar. Intervention of this 
type is sometimes costly. If the market does not 
readjust quickly and allow the Federal Reserve to 
retire the swaps, losses can occur as the exchange 
rates move along their longer run trend. 
Analyzing the success of Federal Reserve swap 
policy during the period from  March  1973 to 
October 1978 is difficult. However, some indirect 
observations can  be  made about swap policy. 
During most of this period, the swap network was 
used  sparingly.  From  March  1973  through 
October 1978 only about $5.9 billion in swaps 
were  initiated  by  the  United States  and  $2.8 
billion by  foreign banks.  Thus, on  an annual 
basis, the network has been less active during the 
floating rate period than during the frxed  rate 
period.  Despite a  large growth  of  the foreign 
exchange market, the size of the swap network 
was increased only about 25 per cent. (See Table 
1.) The swap network was inactive because the 
dollar was a generally weak currency during most 
of this period and the United States preferred to 
keep intervention to a minimum. Until late 1977, 
the Federal Reserve's  policy stance was one of 
leaning "gently" against the  wind.  Therefore, 
since U.S.  intervention was modest and foreign 
banks generally did not need dollars, the swap 
lines were not heavily used. 
Another measure can be used to judge success 
of  Federal  Reserve  intervention  policy-the 
profitability  of  its  current  foreign  exchange 
operations.  However,  this  measure  has  two 
weaknesses. First, the Federal Reserve does not 
view  intervention  as  a  speculative  activity; 
therefore, its policy is to retire swaps as soon as 
practicable. As a result, the Federal Reserve may 
accept an exchange loss and retire a swap at a 
time when the dollar is expected to appreciate. 
Second, the Federal  Reserve sometimes inter- 
venes in a falling market to smooth the dollar's 
decline; as  a  result,  losses  sometimes  occur. 
While intervention directed at short-run market 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City Table 3 
NET REALIZED PROFITS (+) 




MARCH 1973 THROUGH 
DECEMBER 1978 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Year  Profitability 
1973"  +I .O 
1974  +4.1 
1975  +8.0 
1976  +6.2 
1977  +4.6 
1978t  -33.4 
Total  -9.5 
*Three-fourths of  1973 profits. 
t~he  Federal Reserve also had $58.4  million in  unreal- 
ized losses from the revaluation  of  its swap debt at the 
end  of  1978.  However, a January  20 estimate  of  the 
effects  of  the  dollar's  appreciation  since  January  1, 
1979, showed  these losses to be eliminated  at current 
exchange rates. 
SOURCE:  Federal  Reserve Bank of  New York, Quarter- 
ly  Bulletin, Summer 1978, p. 54; Federal Reserve Bank 
of  New  York, Quarterly  Bulletin,  Autumn 1978, p. 10; 
Federal Reserve Press Release, January 8,  1979. 
authorities were unable to counter the movement 
against the dollar during the next 13 months. 
From October 1977 through October 1978, the 
dollar  fell  sharply  in  the  foreign  exchange 
markets. In fact, the dollar fell rapidly against 
every major currency  except the Canadian dollar, 
with  the  fall  in  the  effective  exchange  rate 
totaling over 11 per cent. l3  By late October, U.S. 
authorities felt that the decline in the dollar was 
greater  than  was  justified  by  fundamental 
factors. 
In late 1977 and early 1978, the decline of the 
dollar  appeared  to  be  based  on  economic 
fundamentals. During 1976 and 1977, the U.S. 
economy not only grew and inflated faster than 
most other industrial nations, but the U.S.  trade 
balance  also  turned  negative  in  1976,  and 
seriously so in 1977, with a deficit of $31 billion. 
However, by mid-1978 the trade balance, while 
still in deficit, was gradually improving and U.  S. 
interest rates were rising relative to foreign rates. 
Still,  despite  the  improvement  of  these 
fundamental  economic  factors,  the  dollar's 
decline was accelerating. The continued decline 
stemmed from a general belief that the dollar 
would continue to fall faster than international 
interest  rate differentials would  indicate, 
causing  people  to  diversify  away  from  the 
disorders should  be  generally  profitable,  the 
"rear guard" defenses of a falling dollar some- 
times results in losses. Table 3 shows the results 
for the floating rate period. During the first four 
years of the float, the dollar was not subjected to 
major  speculative  attacks;  as  a  result, 
intervention was  slightly  profitable.  Then,  in 
1978, with the massive attack on the dollar, the 
Federal Reserve's job became one of keeping the 
market from becoming highly disorderly. In the 
short run, some losses had to be taken." 
Prior to October 1977, floating rate interven- 
tion policy appeared to be generally successful in 
preventing disorderly markets.  However,  U.  S. 
12 One can argue that interest  costs  should  be  included 
when  measuring  the  profitability  of  swaps.  However, 
placing swap funds in  nonnegotiable Treasury certificates 
of  indebtedness  merely results in  the Treasury borrowing 
funds from foreign central banks rather than in the open 
market.  The  only  diierence  is  that,  in  this  case,  the 
recipient of the interest is predetermined rather than being 
determined by the highest bidder in the market. 
13 The "effective  exchange  rate" used  by  Morgan 
Guaranty  Trust  Company  of  New  York  measures  the 
change in our exchange rate relative to the currencies  of 
our 15 primary trading partners using a geometric average. 
Weighting is based on each country's share of U.S.  exports 
and imports.  Thus,  since Canada accounts for almost  40 
per cent of U.S.  trade, the weakness of the Canadian dollar 
prevented  the  effective  exchange  rate  from  declining 
further. 
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the dollar's decline was likely to continue unless 
some action was taken by  U.S.  authorities. 
Since the dollar's decline was inflationary, as 
well as being damaging to a climate of growth 
and investment, U. S.  authorities decided  that 
confidence in the dollar should be restored.Is On 
November  1,  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the 
Treasury announced a joint program directed at 
combating  inflation  and  strengthening  the 
dollar. 
The  new  program  acted  to  strengthen  the 
dollar  in  three  $ays.  The  Federal  Reserve's 
discount rate was raised from 8%  per cent to 9% 
per cent, and domestic banks were encouraged to 
borrow from the Eurodollar market through the 
imposition of a 2 per cent supplementary reserve 
requirement on  all domestic time  deposits of 
$100,000 or more.I6 Also, plans were announced 
for  a  major  expansion  of  the  intervention 
capabilities of both the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury. 
A four-part program was instituted to expand 
U  .S . intervention capabilities.  First,  the U. S. 
Treasury made use of some of the reserves which 
were unconditionally  available from the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). This included an 
immediate $2 billion drawing in marks and yen 
from its reserve tranche, and the sale of  SDR's 
valued  at  $1.4  billion.  The  Treasury  also 
made a $1  billion  reserve  tranche drawing in 
14 Theoretically, a person  would  not  object to holding a 
depreciating  currency  if  the  interest  premium  on  that 
currency, relative to the alternative currencies, was equal to 
the rate of  depreciation. 
15 Estimates of  the inflationary effect of the dollar's decline 
range from  a one-quarter of 1 per  cent to a  2 per  cent 
Consumer Price Index increase per 10  per cent decline of 
the dollar on a trade-weighted basis. The latter estimate is 
probably closer to the truth. 
16 The encouragement was doubly effective because of  the 
August removal of  reserve requirements on funds raised in 
the Eurodollar market. It is also noteworthy, however, that 
the  Federal  Reserve  sterilized  the  $3  billion  reserve 
contraction that this new rule would have caused. 
marks  and  yen,  through  the  IMF's  General 
Agreement to Borrow  (GAB) facility." While 
these  facilities  had  long  been  available,  the 
United  States  had  chosen  not  to  use  them. 
However,  including these  actions  in  this 
program helped to reaffirm the seriousness of 
the current policy stance. 
Second, the U.S.  intervention potential was 
expanded by  increasing the Federal  Reserve's 
swap  lines  with  the  Japanese,  German,  and 
Swiss  central  banks.  These  three  lines  were 
expanded  by  $7.6  billion to $15 billion.  (See 
Table 1.) In conjunction with  this act was  an 
implicit  statement  that  rather  freer  access 
would be given to these lines, and the explicit 
statement that the yen line would  be activated 
by the U.S.  for the first time. 
Third, the Treasury announced plans to issue 
up to $10  billion  in  foreign-denominated 
securities in the German, Swiss,  and Japanese 
capital  markets  to  obtain  additional  foreign 
exchange for  intervention purposes.  The  first 
sale was  of  $1.6  billion in  mark-denominated 
two- and four-year notes which were sold in the 
German  capital  markets  on  December  12, 
1978. A $1.2 billion  Swiss  franc issue of  two 
and one-half- and four-year notes was sold  in 
Switzerland on January 18. 
Finally, in  December, the monthly Treasury 
gold sale was increased from 300,000 ounces to 
a minimum of 1.5 million ounces to expand the 
supply  of  publicly  available  gold  and  help 
relieve pressure on the dollar.18 The action also 
was  expected  to  improve  the  U.S.  trade 
balance, since much of  the gold would be sold 
to foreigners. l9 
The  new  program also indicated  that  U.S. 
l7  The GAB is a  lending arrangement between  the IMF 
and seven  industrial IMF members and Switzerland. The 
purpose of  the GAB is to lend specific currencies to the 
Fund should the need arise. 
The United States also had previously announced plans 
to increase its gold sale to 750,000 ounces in November. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City intervention was  to become  more  aggressive. 
Prior  to the  November  announcement,  inter- 
vention generally had  been  directed  solely  at 
exchange  market  conditions.  Now,  as  indi- 
cated by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, 
the United States  would  counter  a  decline  in 
the  dollar  that  had  "exceeded  any  decline 
related to fundamental factors."20 Further, the 
release indicated that the United States would 
intervene "in  a  forceful  and  coordinated 
manner" directed at the "correction  of  recent 
excessive  exchange  rate   movement^."^'  Thus, 
rather than leaning against the wind, the new 
program tried to bring about some realignment 
of exchange rates. 
While it is too early to judge the success of 
this program, the early results are promising. 
The initial actions to reverse market sentiment 
about the dollar were highly successful. In the 
first two days of  the prigram, the dollar rose 
appreciably  against  most  major  currencies. 
Moreover, a major test of the dollar came after 
the December 17 announcement of  the OPEC 
oil  price increase.  The market discounted this 
information quickly, and conditions were again 
19 It  is  also  noteworthy  that  between  October  27  and 
October  31,  the limit on the  Federal  Reserve's  net  open 
position in  foreign exchange was  raised  from  S1.5 to  $5 
billion. This increased the ability of the Federal Reserve to 
incur swap debt to obtain foreign exchange with  which to 
intervene to support the dollar. 
20 Joint  Statement  of  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  W. 
Michael  Blumenthal,  and  Federal  Reserve  Board  Chair- 
man,  G.  William Miller, Federal  Reserve  Press Release, 
November 1, 1978, p. 1. 
21 Joint Statement, pp. 1-2. 
quiet by  the middle of  the next business day, 
although the dollar did remain somewhat weak 
for the rest of  December. Since then, the mar- 
ket has been stable and the dollar has generally 
firmed.  From October 30  through  the end  of 
February, the dollar has risen almost 5 per cent 
on a trade-weighted basis, while rising 7.5 per 
cent against the German  mark, 14.5 per cent 
against the  Japanese  yen,  and  13.8  per  cent 
against the Swiss franc. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the early  1%0's, U.S.  authorities have 
intervened  from  time  to  time  in  the  foreign 
exchange  markets  in  support  of  the  U.S. 
dollar.  This  intervention,  conducted  mainly 
through the swap network, has proven to be a 
useful  tool  for  helping  achieve  the  nation's 
international monetary goals. These goals have 
included defending the Bretton Woods system, 
preserving orderly  foreign  exchange  markets, 
and maintaining confidence in the dollar's role 
as a key international currency. Experience has 
shown  that  intervention  in  foreign  exchange 
markets  has  been  a  useful  and  low-cost 
instrument  of  short-run  international  policy. 
However, in the longer run, the achievement of 
international policy goals depends primarily on 
basic underlying economic conditions. Thus, it 
is  important  that  the  United  States  tie  its 
intervention  activity  to  policies  designed  to 
reduce the internal  rate of  price inflation and 
improve the nation's  international  balance  of 
payments position. 
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